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Sex: The Real Anxiety 
Amanda Holmes 
This paper addresses the topic of anxiety within the context of several key arguments 
in Alenka Zupančič’s What is Sex? Beginning with a discussion of the ontologically 
uncertain character of sex and sexuality, the paper draws from Lacan’s Seminar X to 
elaborate the affective dimension of this ontological uncertainty. The paper then 
considers the relation of sex to anxiety in order to address Zupančič’s critique of 
gender theory. By comparing Zupančič’s reading of Joan Riviere’s “Womanliness as 
Masquerade” to the reading of the same text by Judith Butler in Gender Trouble, this 
paper shows that the main difference between Zupančič’s approach to the question 
of sexuality and Butler’s theory of gender performativity is best understood in relation 
to their respective approaches to a “sheer ontological anxiety.” The paper concludes 
with an analogy between the anxiety of sex and the surprise of love. 
 
In an attempt to formulate an answer that is as direct as the question Alenka 
Zupančič poses in the title of What is Sex? one could simply say: Sex is nothing. This 
nothing is not at all a simple nothing. Maybe it is something like a sweet nothing. Or, 
instead, like the nothing that we find in the melodramatic cliché: “It meant nothing, I 
swear!” Or, even more still, it is the nothing we find in a certain Herr K’s declaration to 
a certain young Dora: “My wife is nothing to me,”1 a phrase that earns him a suitably 
strident slap. In other words, it is a nothing that resounds; it is a nothing that is 
certainly something, at least insofar as it has its effects.  
For Zupančič, “Sex is of ontological relevance: not as an ultimate reality, but as 
an inherent twist, or stumbling block, of reality.”2 That’s the major premise of this 
book. It is a premise that Zupančič brings to a number of different discussions 
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spanning contemporary theory and recent approaches to ontology. One is tempted 
to say that Zupančič provides here an exercise in poly-theory. As opposed to mono-
theory, which would demand utter fidelity to just one discourse, Zupančič’s main 
premise is promiscuously and playfully brought to, and thought with, a number of 
theoretical and philosophical partners. That’s not to say that Zupančič is an advocate 
of the (theoretical) orgy; this book is certainly no free for all! Rather, Zupančič shows 
that the question “What is Sex?” as it is posed by psychoanalysis, can be 
meaningfully and productively paired with the most important and serious questions 
in philosophy while attending to the singularity of each one individually… or, at least 
that’s the ideal aim. In the end, some partners are given more attention than others 
and Zupančič is faithful to the Lacanian discourse throughout.  
Bringing together ontology, epistemology, and psychoanalysis, Zupančič 
illustrates that “One of the founding gestures of psychoanalysis was to cut short the 
discussion of sexuality as a moral question by relating it to an epistemological 
difficulty, with immanent ontological relevance.”3 That is, by posing the question 
“What is sex?” psychoanalysis exposes an absence, a rupture, a gap that is primarily 
epistemological but that also offers an obstacle for ontology. Zupančič develops her 
titular question as one that leads us straight to the heart of an ontological negativity. 
This ontological negativity is exposed by and implied in the question of sex and 
sexuality; it is Zupančič’s riff on what Lacan called “the Real.” The ontological 
relevance of the question “What is Sex?” is not so much that it gives us the Real as 
Being, but rather that it exposes “The Real,” as “precisely not being but its inherent 
impasse.”4 Parodying Heidegger’s observation that we live already in an 
understanding of Being even though its meaning is shrouded in darkness, Zupančič 
explains that the strange thing about sex is that “Sex is all around but we don’t seem 
to know exactly what it is.”5 Like Justice Potter Stewart’s so-called “obscenity test,”6 all 
we can really say is that, well… “we know it when we see it.”  What is particular about 
sex is that it is precisely this impossibility of “knowing what it is” that constitutes it and 
that situates it between epistemology and ontology. Even though ‘we know it when 
we see it,’ we still can’t say pre-figuratively exactly what it is. What compels 
psychoanalysis to ask the question “What is sex?” is that in spite of this 
epistemological difficulty, we also know that sex exists. It’s just that what sex is is 
determined by this ‘not knowing what it is,’ knowing it, in a sense, only through its 
effects. Zupančič writes, “beyond all sexual content and practices the sexual is not a 
pure form but refers instead to the absence of this form as that which curves and 
defines the space of the sexual.”7  In other words sex marks a gap, a rift, a rupture; 
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and as such, it provides an opening onto the difficult concept of the Real, understood 
as a “stumbling block of the space of being, [existing] only as the inherent 
contradiction of (symbolic) being.”8   It’s not just that sex, like being, is “said in many 
ways,” but rather it is difficult to say the way in which sex is at all. 
Zupančič establishes that the question “What is sex?” is the only proper 
response to the question “why is psychoanalysis obsessed with sex?” She begins by 
giving an account of why (Freudian) psychoanalysis has been (rather notoriously) 
focused on sex and on sexuality as so central to the human psyche and why this has 
been such a source of anxiety. What is more troubling, according to Zupančič, than 
the fact that psychoanalysis seems to have only one thing on its mind, so to speak, is 
that it doesn’t really tell us what this one thing is.  
 
What was, and still is, disturbing about the Freudian discussion of 
sexuality is not simply sexuality itself−this kind of resistance, indignant at 
psychoanalytic “obsession with dirty matters,” was never the strongest 
one, and was soon marginalized by the progressive liberalism of morals. 
Much more disturbing was the thesis concerning the always 
problematic and (ontologically) uncertain character of sexuality itself.9 
 
Why, we might ask, would this ontologically uncertain character of sexuality be so 
disturbing and why would it produce such an anxiety? Would it be the simple fact 
that we can’t say determinatively what sex is? After all, there are perhaps many other 
things about which we might say the same. For example, (starting with the 
cheesiest) “What is love?” or “What is happiness?” or “What is truth?” are question 
that lead to other ontological uncertainties. However, towards the end of Lacan’s 
Seminar X, his seminar on Anxiety, Lacan says clearly “anxiety is the truth of 
sexuality”10  and this comment gives us a hint. While Zupančič does not provide an 
explicit analysis of how the Lacanian concept of anxiety is entailed in this 
disturbance at the psychoanalytic obsession with sex, we can see that the question 
“What is sex?” bears a striking similarity to the paradigmatic questions of anxiety that 
Lacan develops in the first lesson of Seminar X: “Che vuoi? Que veux-tu? Que me 
veut-il?” (What wouldst thou? What does the Other want with me? How does he 
want me? What does he want concerning this place of the ego?)11  These questions 
introduce the function of anxiety according to Lacan. This function is one of knotting 
together the concept of desire on the one hand with that of narcissistic identification 
on the other. That is, anxiety marks the problematic relation to the Other whereby any 
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access to one’s desire for the Other is tied to one’s dependence on the Other. 
Although the question Que me veut-Il?  doesn’t exactly carry the same allure as the 
question “What is sex?” it too leads us to the ontological uncertainty and negativity 
that Zupančič delineates in her book. Like these other questions that define anxiety 
for Lacan, the question “What is sex?” also puts us in question, interrogating us at the 
very level of our being.  That is, the question “What is Sex?” implies another question, 
a question about the root of desire, about the cause of desire. In short, the question 
confronts us with what Lacan called the object a as the object cause of desire, as 
something that “is most in me [but] lies on the outside.”12 The question of sex asks 
about that which is at once most intimate – “being intimate” as a common 
euphemism for sex, after all – and constitutively inaccessible as epistemologically 
uncertain in a fundamental sense. The paradox of the question of sex propels us 
head first into the throws of anxiety. Luckily Zupančič is there to remind us that this 
tumble can land us in a very interesting place. 
While much of What is Sex? addresses the way in which this absent space of 
the sexual (as an opening onto the Real) has consequences for ontology, in 
particular the way it problematizes the endeavor to establish a ‘realist’ ontology and 
the proliferation of new ontologies, I want to focus here on the stakes of Zupančič’s 
argument for the underlying ontological commitments within the most predominant 
theoretical discourses around sex and sexuality of the present: namely, the 
performative ontology that prevails in contemporary Gender Theory in the legacy of 
the seminal arguments made in Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble. Zupančič follows the 
work of Joan Copjec, who argues that the birth of Gender Theory and Gender 
Studies in the 1980s and 90s performed an astounding feat in that it removed the sex 
from sex.13 Zupančič’s question “What is Sex?” thus demonstrates the return to a 
forgotten question: not the forgetting of being, as Heidegger would have it, but the 
forgetting instead of sex.  The claim is not, however, that psychoanalysis will “bring 
the sexual coloring of the universe back into focus again, as if re-enchanting it 
(sexually),”14 it is rather that Gender Theory has rendered the problem and the 
question of sex more difficult to see by treating the concept of gender as if it were an 
answer to the question of sex. It should be said that the call to ‘return to sex’ has also 
been made in Queer Theory in more recent years. Annamarie Jagose’s book, 
Orgasmology15 and Judith Roof’s What Gender Is, What Gender Does16 are both 
examples of such a proposal to return to the question of sex in the face of a 
predominant commitment to theories of gender performativity that have dominated 
the discourse over the past 30 years. These texts evidence a discontent in the legacy 
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of gender theory’s performative ontology and would be helpful interlocutors for 
thinking further about the implications of Zupančič’s contribution to contemporary 
thinking on sex and sexuality. But for now, I will focus on one aspect of this 
contribution by establishing the stakes of Zupančič’s challenge to Butler’s 
performative ontology. 
Zupančič understands Butler’s performative ontology as an account of the 
“actions that create, so to speak, the essences that they express,”17 thereby allowing 
“sociosymbolic constructions, by dint of repetition and reiteration [to] become 
nature”18 and thus to turn “the dialectics of nature and culture [into] the internal 
dialectics of culture.”19 This depiction of Butler’s account seems compatible with 
several key aspects of Lacanian theory: as Zupančič points out, it agrees with a 
Lacanian emphasis on the creationist dimension of the Symbolic, with the Lacanian 
claim that language is constitutive of reality, and with Lacan’s emphasis on the 
materiality of the signifier. And while Zupančič acknowledges both the radicality of 
Butler’s theory of performativity and the considerable compatibility between this 
theory and Lacanian psychoanalysis,20 she ultimately identifies the dimension of the 
Real as something that renders the Lacanian position irreducibly different from 
Butler’s performative ontology. There are two questions I’d like to address here: First, 
what exactly is this irreducible difference? And second, what difference does this 
difference make for Butler’s performative ontology?  
In short, the disagreement between Zupančič and Butler seems to be around 
what is made of a certain gap, negativity, or limit that Zupančič thinks through the 
concept of the Real. In the past, when Butler has responded to questions regarding 
the status of the Real in her work, she has agreed in large part with some of the 
central aspects of the notion of the Real, qualifying it to mean “the invariable 
incompleteness of the subject,” or “the point where self-representation founders and 
fails,” or “the inability of the social category to capture the mobility and complexity of 
persons.” 21  In short, Butler seems to basically agree with the notion that there are 
limitations of what can be represented conceptually, with the idea that there are 
confines to what is accessible within what Lacan called the Symbolic Order, what 
Butler thinks in terms of “the structures that govern symbolizability”.22 Ultimately, 
however, Butler has rejected the concept of the Real. As she has written elsewhere in 
response to a question posed by Slavoj Žižek: 
 
We can agree that there is a limit to conceptualization and to any given 
formulation of sociality, and that we encounter this limit at various 
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liminal and spectral moments in experience. But why are we then 
compelled to give a technical name to this limit, 'the Real', and to make 
the further claim that the subject is constituted by this foreclosure?23 
 
I suggest that the key argument in What is Sex? is a response to this very 
question. While Butler takes issue primarily with the nomenclature of ‘the Real,’ and 
characterizes it as unhelpful jargon, the real question that she poses is: why would 
we think of “the limits of conceptualization,” as she puts it (or, alternatively, of “the 
ruptures within the Symbolic” or “the Real” as both Žižek and Zupančič would 
maintain) as being so central to the subject? What is frustrating about Butler’s 
response here is that by casting the disagreement in terms of a question about the 
name of the limit in question, she obscures what is at the heart of the disagreement. 
The whole point of calling this “limit of conceptualization,” or “rupture,” or “gap,” “the 
Real” is to lay claim to the fact that psychoanalysis has something to say not only 
about the constitution and conditions of the subject but about reality and about 
Being. Zupančič’s claim in What is Sex? not only insists that the rupture and the limit 
that goes by the name of the Real is indeed constitutive of the subject but further that 
this rupture has consequences for thinking Being as such. Doubling down on the 
notion of the rupture in the Symbolic and the fundamental negativity elaborated in 
the Lacanian notion of the Real, Zupančič situates the importance of psychoanalysis 
not only for thinking the constitution of the subject but also for thinking the question 
of Being and the field of ontology.  
Zupančič’s elaboration of the ontological dimension of sex has implications 
that go both ways. On the one hand, sex (as a stumbling block or gap) poses a 
problem for ontology and on the other hand ontology, or the question of being, poses 
a problem for how we think and have thought about sex and sexuality. In particular, it 
poses a problem for the thinking Butler’s performative ontology, the core of which 
Butler explains in the following claim: “that the gendered body is performative 
suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which 
constitute its reality.”24 Butler’s theory of performativity is an ontology insofar as is 
renders performativity “responsible for both the logos and the being of things”25 but it 
also avoids any strong ontological claim and evades the very question that Zupančič 
poses by linking sex and ontology through the Real. Zupančič elaborates the Real as 
something that is produced on top of and in addition to the symbolic articulations 
that are aligned with the space of performativity as articulated by Butler.  
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The signifier does not only produce a new, symbolic reality (including its own 
materiality, causality, and laws); it also “produces” the dimension that Lacan 
calls the Real, which is related to the points of structural 
impossibility/contradiction of symbolic reality itself.26  
 
Zupančič identifies the Real with a gap within the very system of signifying 
structures that Butler’s theory of performativity delineates and presupposes. What 
Butler’s theory of performativity covers over is precisely the ontological dimension of 
sex as situated at this very limit of Symbolic exchange, that is to say, at the internal 
limit of language. What is missing in Butler’s articulation of the “limits of 
conceptualization” is that these limits are not limits that mark something outside of 
language but instead mark an inaccessible inside. Zupančič explains this internal 
limit, this rupture within the Symbolic, or inaccessible inside through the notion of a 
“constitutively missing signifier.” She writes:  
 
Sexuality is not some being that exists beyond the symbolic; it “exists” 
solely as the contradiction of the symbolic space that appears because 
of the constitutively missing signifier, and of what appears at its place 
(enjoyment). It would thus be wrong to say that the signifier of the sexual 
is missing; the sexual is not some extradiscursive object lacking a 
signifier; rather, it is a direct consequence (“extension”) of the missing of 
a signifier, that is, of the gap with which the signifying order emerges.27 
 
Aligning the missing signifier with the Real, Zupančič is here suggesting that 
the Real is not something outside of the Symbolic system, the very system that 
renders performativity intelligible, but is instead something that is internal to that 
system and constitutive of it as an internal limit. In other words, the Real abides by 
the logic of what Lacan called the “extimate,” an internal externality, some alien 
element at the very core of the subject. As Mladen Dolar has described it, the 
extimate, “points neither to the interior nor to the exterior, but is located there where 
the most intimate interiority coincides with the exterior and becomes threatening, 
provoking horror and anxiety.”28 The disagreement with Butler about the adequacy of 
performative ontology for thinking about sex returns then to the relation of sexuality 
to anxiety. Anxiety, we might say is the signal of the ontological negativity of sex, a 
point that would be missed if one focuses only on the performative nature of gender 
and of sexuality. 
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One possible reading (and potential resolution) of the debate between Butler 
and Zupančič, as I have characterized it here, would be to draw a distinction between 
sex on the one hand and sexuality on the other and to claim that Butler’s 
performative ontology is concerned with sexuality and gender (and their 
manifestations in the Symbolic) while Zupančič is drawing our attention to sex as the 
rupture within the Symbolic that opens onto the Real. To say, in short, that there is 
not so much a disagreement between Butler’s performative ontology and Zupančič’s 
articulation of the ontological negativity of sex as there is a diverging focus of their 
respective projects. While Zupančič articulates sex as a gap, a rupture, or a stumbling 
block in reality, Butler describes the processes whereby performances of gender and 
sexuality cover over this rupture in our experience of reality. Such a reading would 
seem to cohere with some of Zupančič’s formulations. For example, she writes, 
“Sexuality is not ravaged by, or disturbed, because of a gap cutting deep into its 
“tissue,” it is, rather, the messy sewing up of this gap.”29 If sex is the gap, in other 
words, then sexuality is the attempt to deal with it. We might resolve the debate by 
saying that Zupančič describes one and Butler describes the other. I’m afraid, 
however, that such a reading would be too easy. And it would miss the real 
ontological import of Zupančič’s project: that we can’t think the Symbolic dimensions 
of sexuality as separable from the ontological negativity of sex.  
In order to illustrate what I take to be the key difference between Zupančič and 
Butler on the question of ontology, we can compare their respective readings of a 
key text that situates their arguments on the ontological status of sex, sexuality, and 
gender performativity: Joan Riviere’s 1929 text “Womanliness as a Masquesrade.” 
Riviere’s essay takes up the case of a young woman who suffered great anxiety 
every time she would present her work in public. In this particular case the young 
woman’s anxiety would manifest itself in a very strange way. After every public 
presentation of her work, she would engage compulsively in “flirting and coquetting” 
with the colleagues to whom she had just presented her work, men who seemed to 
be very clear “father figures” for the analysand. Riviere reads this behavior as “an 
attempt to ward off the anxiety which would ensue on account of the reprisals she 
anticipated from the father-figures after her intellectual performance. The exhibition 
in public of her intellectual proficiency, which was in itself carried through 
successfully, signified an exhibition of herself in possession of the father’s penis, 
having castrated him.”30 The young woman’s flirting is thus read as an attempt to 
perform a “womanliness” in order to disguise herself as not having the phallus, “to 
hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was 
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found to possess it.”31  Riviere’s account identifies this case as one of “a type of 
homosexual woman whose aim is to obtain ‘recognition from men.”32 Ultimately, 
Riviere uses this case to illustrate not that some women use womanliness as a mask 
but rather that this case illustrates something about “womanliness,” as such.  Riviere 
writes, “The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where I draw the line 
between genuine womanliness and the ‘masquerade’. My suggestion is not, 
however, that there is any such difference; whether radical or superficial, they are the 
same thing.”33 With a sense of Riviere’s central thesis in tow, let us now take a quick 
look at Butler’s and Zupančič’s respective readings of Riviere’s text. 
Butler’s reading of Riviere’s essay focuses primarily on the problematic way in 
which “Riviere begins with set notions about what it is to display characteristics of 
one’s sex, and how it is that those plain characteristics are understood to express or 
reflect an ostensible sexual orientation.”34 Butler’s reading of this text provides a 
thorough analysis of Riviere’s assumptions about the homosexuality of the analysand 
in question. Ultimately, for Butler, “If Riviere’s analysand is a homosexual without 
homosexuality, that may be because that option is already refused her.”35 On Butler’s 
reading of the case “What is hidden is not sexuality but rage”36 and Riviere misses this 
because of the normative heterosexuality that her theoretical framework 
(psychoanalysis) presupposes. Taking issue with the hetero-normative assumptions 
in Riviere’s analysis, Butler reads this case as illustrating “the predicament produced 
by a matrix that accounts for all desire for women by subjects of whatever sex or 
gender as originating in a masculine, heterosexual position.”37 Butler’s reading 
accurately describes the cultural existence of the prohibitions within the case as it is 
articulated by Riviere in 1929 and further, her critique of Riviere rightly asks us to 
consider exactly what kind of sexuality psychoanalysis authorizes and presupposes. 
For Zupančič, on the other hand, in spite of these problematic aspects of Riviere’s 
analysis, it illustrates something else, something on top of and in addition to the 
problematic social and historical conditions of the case: 
 
…at stake here is not simply the dread of being punished for stealing the 
father’s property, but also, more fundamentally, the anxiety of literally 
being nothing: if her intellectual performance was attributable to stolen 
property, then who, or what, or where, is “she”? In other words, the really 
troubling question here is: What if I am not really anything, what if there 
is no “me” in any of this? This ontological anxiety doesn’t stop at “Am I 
that name?,” rather, it revolves around “Do I exist at all?” All that I have 
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left at this point is a pretense, a mask. The subject hinges on this mask, 
and not perhaps the other way around. Under the mask there is nothing 
but sheer ontological anxiety.38 
 
So by now, I have identified three different ways in which anxiety has 
cropped up as the underlying aspect of the ontological negativity implied in 
the question of sex. First, in comparing the question “What is Sex?” to the 
paradigmatic questions of anxiety in Seminar X, chiefly “What does the Other 
want concerning this place of the ego?” Second, in showing how the extimate 
structure of the Real is situated at the epicenter of the debate between Butler’s 
performative ontology and the ontological negativity that Zupančič elaborates. 
And finally, Butler’s and Zupančič’s respective readings of Joan Riviere’s text 
“On Womanliness as Masquerade” suggest that the important difference 
between Butler and Zupančič is in their relations to a “sheer ontological 
anxiety” behind the question of sex. 
If the first answer I gave in response to the question “What is sex?” was 
“it’s nothing,” we might now say instead “Sex is anxiety.” But in the final 
sections of What is Sex? Zupančič turns from the question of sex to the 
question of love. And here another possibility emerges. If the question of sex 
teaches us about the structure of the absent signifier, or gap within the 
symbolic, then there is something else which the turn to love will address. 
Love does something else with this gap, this ontological negativity: it holds 
open a space for the creation of a new signifier. Drawing on Badiou’s concept 
of the Event and what might come after it, Zupančič puts forward the following 
possibility: 
A love (encounter) is not simply about everything falling into its rightful 
place. A love encounter is not simply about a contingent match between 
two different pathologies, about two individuals being lucky enough to 
encounter in each other what “works for them.” Rather, love is what 
makes it work.  Love does something to us. It makes, or allows for, the 
cause of our desire to condescend to, to coincide with, our lover. And 
the affect of this is surprise.39 
 
Zupančič offers that the formulation of love is not “you are it! Your predicates 
are all the ones I’ve been looking for!” but rather “how surprising that you are 
you!”  I’d like to conclude by suggesting that Zupančič’s concluding chapter 
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reveals a very interesting and important shift that we might identify as her 
response to an existentialist ontology characterized by the theme of anxiety: 
while I’ve tried to show that the question of sex produces anxiety, love, on the 
other hand, produces surprise. In short, the ontological negativity that sex is 
(and the anxiety that this entails) makes possible the surprise that love can be.  
Zupančič’s final chapter brings us back to ontology in this way: love discloses 
something, not something about ourselves, nor something about the beloved, 
but love discloses being, and the affect of this disclosure is not at all anxiety 
but is instead surprise.
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irreducibly different from [Butler’s] performative ontology” 40.  
21 Judith Butler, et al. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Verso, 2011., 30 
22 Judith Butler, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality.  2011, 144. 
23 Judith Butler, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality.  2011, 152. 
24 Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge, 1990. 
25 Zupančič, 40. 
26 Zupančič, 41. 
27 Zupančič, 42. 
28 Mladen Dolar, “I shall be with you on your wedding-night: Lacan and the Uncanny” October 58 (Fall 
1991). 5-23. 
29 Zupančič, 43. 
30 Joan Riviere “Womanliness as Masquerade” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 1929, vol. 10, 
pp. 303-313.305. 
31 Riviere, 306. 
32 Riviere, 306. 
33 Riviere, 306. 
34 Zupančič,  64. 
35 Butler, Gender Trouble, 68. 
36 Butler, Gender Trouble, 67. 
37 Butler, Gender Trouble, 68 
38 Zupančič, 56. 
39 Zupančič, 135. 
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